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JO DESHA LUCAS

DRAGON IN

THE THICKET:

A PERUSAL OF GOMILLION

V. LIGHTFOOT

At this date it should go without saying that there is no realm of
action in which a state legislature is free to ignore the requirements
of the Constitution of the United States. In the recent case of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,1 however, the Supreme Court had to say
it again. Gomillion was one of the more recent battles in the complex racial conflict for political control of Macon County, Alabama,
and its county seat, the city of Tuskeegee. Macon County is located in east-central Alabama, midway between Montgomery and
the Georgia state line. Its population of 27,6542 is approximately
seven-eighths Negro. Prior to the acts complained of in Gomillion,
Tuskeegee was square in shape, with a population of 6,707 (5,397
Negroes and 1,310 whites). White voter registration in the city
exceeded Negro registration by 200 (600 white and 400 Negro);
it may be inferred that this proportion was at least partially attribJo Desha Lucas is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2

Record, p. 5. Gomilion was dismissed by the district court for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. 167 F. Supp. 405 (MD. Ala. 1958).
The Supreme Court, therefore, accepted as true the allegations of the complaint.
Unless otherwise noted, the population figures used herein are those stated in the
complaint, where they are referred to as "approximate:'
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utable to varied segregationist tactics on the part of local election
officials. 3 Legal measures to compel more expeditious registration
of Negro voters were under way, however, and eventual Negro
political hegemony seemed probable.4
In the 1957 session of the Alabama legislature, the state senator
from Macon County introduced a bill to redefine the geographical
boundaries of the City of Tuskeegee. This bill, which was enacted
into law as Act 140, contained no preamble. It read simply: "The
boundaries of the City of Tuskeegee in Macon County are hereby
altered, rearranged and redefined so as to include within the corporate limits of said municipality all of the territory lying within
the following described boundaries, and to exclude all territory
lying outside such boundaries... ." A description of the new boundaries by metes and bounds followed. The areas of the city to the
west and northeast, including the site of Tuskeegee Institute, where
3 See REPORT OF THn UNITED STATES Cwt RicHTs CommIssioN 40-68 (1959). For
a "human interest" account of the trials and tribulations of Negroes in their quest
for the franchise in Macon County, Alabama, see The New Yorker, June 10, 1961,
p. 37 et seq.
4See United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961). This case was
originally brought against the Board of Registration in Macon County and two
alleged members of the Board in order to enjoin their interference with the right
to vote because of race or color. By the time the cause was heard, the members
of the Board had resigned and accepted other employment. The State of Alabama
had in the meanwhile been joined as a defendant. The district court dismissed
the suit because: (1) the individual defendants no longer members of the board
were improper parties, (2) the board, having no separate legal existence, could not
be sued, and (3) the State was not a person within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Acts, 16 Star. 140 (1870), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1970, 1970(c) (1958). United States
v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1958). The decision of the district court
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United States v.
Alabama, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959). Between the date of the decision in the
court of appeals and the hearing in the Supreme Court on certiorari, the Civil
Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), was enacted. Section 601 (b) of that Act
expressly authorized actions against the state. 74 Star. 90, 42 U.S.C. S 1971 (c).
The Supreme Court held that § 601 (b) was applicable and remanded the cause
for trial. United States v, Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960). On remand, the district
court made a specific finding that sixty-four Negro citizens, named in an appendix
to its opinion, were qualified by law at the time of their respective applications
for registration and that failure to register them was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and so decreed, but declined "for the time
being" the request of the United States that it appoint voting referees for Macon
County. 192 F. Supp. at 682-.83.
5 Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140, at 185.
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there were heavy concentrations of Negroes, were thus excluded
from the city limits. The new city was shaped, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said, in the form of "an uncouth twenty-eight sided
figure"; 6 the petitioners described it as resembling a sea dragon.
The new city had a population of 1,750, seventy-five per cent of
which was white. Of the 400 registered Negro voters within the
original city limits, only four or five remained in the newly defined
7
city. No white voter or resident lived in the detached area.
Gomillion, the petitioner, was one of the Negro citizens who
lived in the area cut off from the city. On behalf of himself and
approximately 5,000 persons similarly situated, he filed a class suit
in the federal district court, asking for a declaration that Act 140
was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Fifteenth Amendment. He asked for an injunction prohibiting the
enforcement of the Act by the city officials. The district court
dismissed the suit on motion by the defendants on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be
granted, and for want of jurisdiction.8 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, one judge dissenting.9
In dismissing, the district court relied upon Laramie County v.
Albany County,10 Town of Mount Pleasant v. Beckuith,"l and
Hunter v. Pittsburgh2 to establish that political power existed in
the legislature to change the boundaries of its subdivisions without
the consent of the inhabitants, and upon Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co.,13 for the proposition that where such power is shown
to exist, courts may not inquire into the motives of the legislature
in its exercise. The court of appeals affimed the decision to dismiss but tempered to some extent the reliance upon the sweeping
language of the Hunter case. It held that, absent any 14
6 364 U.S. at 340.
7 Id. at 341.

10 92 U.S. 307 (1875).

8 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958).

11100 U.S. 514 (1879).

9 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).

12 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

13 94 U.S. 535 (1876). See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,
162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
14 270 F.2d at 598.
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racial or class discrimination appearing on the fact of the statute, the courts will not hold an act, which decreases the area
of a municipality by changing its boundaries, to be invalid
as violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution although it is alleged that the
enactment was made for the purpose, not appearing in the
Act, and with the effect of excluding or removing Negroes

from the City and depriving them of the privileges and benefits of municipal membership, including the right to vote in
City elections.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Wisdom asserted that the case,
like Colegrove v. Green' 5 and South v.Peters,16 was one in which
courts should refrain from using their equity powers because no
effective relief could be given. The only result that could flow
from a declaration that Act 140 was unconstitutional, Judge
Wisdom suggested, would be a series of subsequent statutes and
cases increasing the tensions between nation and state.' 7 There was
a vigorous dissent by Judge Brown. He saw in Act 140 a clear
legislative purpose to deprive Negroes and only Negroes of "vote
and village"' and in the majority holding a blindness to obvious
facts and reliance upon extravagant dicta. 19
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, inan opinion by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reversed the court of appeals and district
cout, holding that the averments of the complaint adequately
spelled out a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice
Whittaker concurred in the result but disagreed as to the proper
ground. Characterizing the case as one of "fencing Negroes out"
of municipal membership, he saw a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He was of the opinion
that the right to vote guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment is
limited to a right to vote in whatever political unit one finds one's
self. Although Mr. Justice Douglas joined the Court's opinion, he
took the opportunity to state that he adhered to the dissents in
Colegrove v. Green and South v. Peters.
15 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16 339 U.S.276 (1950).

17 270 F.2d at 611.
' 8 Id.at 599.

19 Ibid. The reference to extravagant dicta was to the language in the Court's
opinion in Hunter.
20 362 U.S. 916 (1960).
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I. Tim GOMILLION CASE AND THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Fifteenth Amendment provides that a citizen's right to
vote may not be denied or abridged on the basis of his race or
color.2 1 To establish a violation, therefore, it must be shown that:

(1) he had a right to vote; (2) it was denied or abridged; and (3)
the denial or abridgment was on account of his race or color. The
complaint in Gomillion was carefully framed to make the best
possible case under the Fifteenth Amendment. Though census
figures are given on the racial composition of the City of Tuskeegee
before the effective date of Act 140, no racial composition figures
are given for the new city. The population of the old city was
5,397 Negroes and 1,310 whites, a total of 6,707. It is alleged that
no white resident was excluded, so it may be inferred that the
1,310 whites remained inside the city limits. Since census figures
list the new city as having a population of 1,750, it may be inferred
that unless there has been an influx of whites, the city population
is now approximately one-quarter Negro. Though this percentage
is somewhat below the average for the state at large, it is still a
substantial proportion. The before-and-after figures set out in the
complaint relate exclusively to voters. Before the redefinition of
the city limits, there were 400 registered Negro voters in the city.
After redistricting, there were only five or six.
When these before-and-after figures on Negro voters are placed
in combination with the fact that the city's shape was changed
from a square to "an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure" resembling
a sea dragon, they clearly lead to the conclusion that the drafters
of Act 140 carefully sought out the residences
of Negro voters in
22
order to detach them from the body politic:
According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskeegee city limits with
incidental inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate
to say that it has deprived the petitioners of the municipal
franchise and consequent rights and to that end it has inciden2

1 "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation:'
22 364 U.S. at 347.
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tally changed the city's boundaries. While in form this is merely
an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are
established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only

colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.
Viewed in this way, the facts make a very strong case for the
race-oriented nature of the change in boundaries. They add nothing, however, to the definition of the "ight... to vote" as that
term is employed in the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court is surprisingly silent on this question. Mr. Justice Whittaker is satisfied
with the unadorned assertion that the expression "right to vote"
means a right to vote in any governmental unit in which the citizen
finds himself. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, ignoring the concurring
opinion, leaves only a trail of phrases, such as "pre-existing," 2
"municipal franchise," 24 and "theretofore enjoyed."2 5 In appraising
the two positions, it may be useful to review the earlier authorities
in the Supreme Court dealing with the Fifteenth Amendment.
A. THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT CASES

1. The first thirty years. At the close of the War between the
States there was considerable difference of opinion on the subject
of Negro suffrage in the states that had not seceded. None of them
with any appreciable Negro population permitted Negroes to vote.
But it was generally conceded that Negro suffrage in the South
was necessary to the aims of the Reconstruction program.2 6 The
compromise worked out at that time was to omit from the Fourteenth Amendment any limitations upon the traditional power of
the states to fix the franchise requirements, and to force the southern
states to adopt state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the Negro the right to vote.27 The seceding states' constitutional provisions on suffrage were protected against amendment by Act of
23 Id. at 341.
24 Id. at 347.

25

Ibid.

28 See MAnmws, LEGISLAIVE AN) JuD lcA HistoRY oF = Fwr=N-m AazMNmE= 13 (1909). Between 1857 and 1867 Negro suffrage amendments were submitted

to the voters in New York, Connecticut, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Komsas
and in each instance defeated.
27

Id. at 18.
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Congress, 28 in some cases by the wording of the amendment clauses
in the state constitutions, and by the fact that any amendment
would have to be ratified by a voting population that included large
numbers of Negroes,29 whose political power had been heightened
by the disfranchisement of an appreciable number of whites, including many political leaders of the area. Faith in the permanence
of these provisions was shaky, however, and before the southern
states were permitted to resume their representation in Congress,
the northern differences were ironed out and the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed.30 For three states its ratification was made a
condition precedent to the resumption of Congressional representation.3 1
In the early days after the ratification of the Amendment, therefore, Negro suffrage was a legal, if not a practical, reality, being
guaranteed by both federal and state constitutions. The earliest
cases dealing with the reach and meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment tested the powers of Congress to control intimidation, bribery, and maladministration. During the first thirty years of the
Amendment's existence only two cases reached the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of state constitutional or statutory
provisions. In the first of these the contention was treated as frivolous; 32 the second was dismissed as moot.3 3

In Neal v. Delaware,34 however, the self-executing character of
the Amendment was established obiter. Neal was an attack upon a
guilty verdict in a criminal case on the ground that Negroes had
been systematically excluded from the petit jury. It was argued in
the alternative: either Delaware law excluded Negroes from jury
service, or, contrary to the law, they were systematically excluded.
28 Acts of June 22, 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 72-74.
29

See, e.g., tabulation of votes in the election held in 1869 for the ratification ot
the Virginia Constitution contained in the historical synopsis at p. 28 of the 1873
Virginia Code. There were 149,781 whites registered to vote, and 120,103 Negroes
In actual votes cast, there were 125,114 whites and 97,205 Negroes.
30

MATimws,op. cit. supranote 26, at 22 et seq.

31

1d.at75.

82 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
33 Mills v.Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895).
84 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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In either event, it was argued, the defendant had been denied due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first contendon rested upon the fact that the Delaware Constitution limited
suffrage to white males. Since the statutes limited jury service to

those "qualified to vote," it was argued that Negroes were not
eligible. In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court of Delaware observed that the effect of the Fifteenth Amendment was to
make invalid the state constitutional color limitation on the franchise, and therefore the statute did not so limit jury service. The
Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Harlan, affirmed this construction
but held for the defendant on the alternative ground. The fact that,
although Negroes constituted 26,000 of the state population of
150,000, none had ever been summoned for jury service was held
to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
2. The grandfatherclauses. It can be said without fear of cavil
that southern white Democrats did not enjoy their experience with
Negro suffrage under the reconstruction constitutions. By the turn
of the century, however, they had regained sufficient political
power to repudiate the reconstruction suffrage provisions. The
result was a series of constitutional conventions throughout the
southern states which framed new constitutions to test the limits of
the Fifteenth Amendment. 5 These constitutions were designed to
35 "During the dark days of reconstruction, before the passions engendered by
the war had cooled, another convention assembled in this city and framed a constitution under which we now live-with some modifications. That convention was
composed of aliens to the Commonwealth, and newly emancipated slaves. Virginians to the manner born, who owned the property and paid the taxes, and who
represented the virtue and intelligence of the Commonwealth, were placed under the
ban of proscription and excluded from its halls. The Constitution was proposed as
a condition precedent to the readmission of the State into the Union, and to its
representation in Congress....
"The people have submitted patiently to this Constitution, unsuited, in many respects, to present conditions ... and now, after waiting patiently for thirty odd
years, they have called this Convention.
".... But here to-day we are confronted with some difficulties. When the era of
good feeling shall be entirely restored between the sections and all of the hates growing out of the unhappy fratricidal strife shall be forever 'in the deep bosom of the
ocean buried,' it may be that our northern fellow-citizens for the good of our own
common country, and for the elevation of American citizenship, may consent to
the repeal of [the Fifteenth] amendment, but until that auspicious day shall come,
we are bound in honor and in good faith to observe it and to obey it because it is a
part of the supreme law of this land." President Goode addressing the Virginia Con-
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eliminate from the voter rolls as many of the uneducated and unlanded Negroes as possible without eliminating the equally uneducated and unlanded whites. One of the devices employed was the
so-called "grandfather clause." Though their language varied,
basically these clauses imposed literacy and property qualifications
with exemptions for persons, and the descendants of persons, who
had been eligible to vote prior to Negro suffrage.
The first such clause to reach the Supreme Court was that of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901.0 It set up two classes of voters:
(1) those who had registered to vote by December 20, 1902, and
(2) those who had registered after that date. The first class included two subclasses: (1) persons who had served in the armed
forces of the United States in the War of 1812, the war with
Mexico, any of the wars with the Indians, in the Confederate forces
or in the Alabama armed forces in the War between the States, as
well as the descendants of all these and the descendants of persons who served in the Revolution; and (2) all others of good
moral character who understood the duties and responsibilities of
republican government. Persons qualifying as electors under those
provisions remained electors for life. Persons seeking to register
after December 20, 1902, were required to meet literacy or property qualifications that would disqualify most Alabamans of the day,
white or Negro.
These provisions were challenged in two cases that reached the
8 was
Supreme Court in 1903 and 1904. The first, (iles v. Harris,3
brought by a Negro who was not in the veteran or descendant class
and who, for reasons that do not appear, had not registered prior to
December 20, 1902. Since he did not meet the literacy or property
requirement, the registration board had refused to register him, He
stitutional Convention

of 1901. DEBATES OF THE VmGINrA CONSTIrmmOlAL CoNVENnoN, 1901-1902 19, 20 (1906). President Goode went on to discuss possible stop-gap

methods such as poll taxes, property qualifications, and literacy requirements.
8

oALA. CoNST.

art. 8, §§ 180, 181, 183-88 (1901).

3

7The requirements were in the alternative. Either one must have owned, or be
the husband of a woman who owned, forty acres of land in the State, on which he
lived, or have been able to read and write any article of the Constitution of the
United States and have been regularly engaged in some lawful employment for the
majo.r portion of the year preceding his registration. Id. at §181.
38 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
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sued to compel the board to do so. On appeal from an adverse decision in the United States circuit court, the Supreme Court held, per
Mr. Justice Holmes, that the circuit court was correct in refusing
to compel the registration of the appellant. Two reasons were
given. The first was a technical, legal one. The suit was predicated
upon an allegation that the whole registration scheme provided for
in the Alabama Constitution was a fraud on the Constitution of the
United States and therefore void. If this were so, said Mr. Justice
Holmes, the Court could not grant the relief sought and thereby
require the board to add another voter to its "fraudulent lists." On
the other hand, if the Court were to take the scheme to be legal, the
appellant would not be entitled to the relief sought. The second
reason stemmed from the Court's practical judgment about the
limits of possible relief under equity decrees. Reading the allegatons of the complaint as charging a conspiracy of the white population of a whole state to keep Negroes from voting, the Court was
of the opinion that "a name on a piece of paper will not defeat
them." Unless the Court were prepared to supervise the voting in
Alabama through its officers, all the plaintiff could get from equity
would be an empty form. Justices Brewer,39 Brown,40 and Harlan
dissented.41
Meanwhile, back in Alabama, Giles filed an action in the state
courts seeking a writ of mandamus to force the board to register
him, as well as an action for money damages for its failure to do so.
In the action for damages, the Supreme Court of Alabama took a
position not unlike that of Holmes in Giles vu. Harris.If the scheme
were unconstitutional, said the Alabama court, then the board had
no power to register the plaintiff, and its failure to do what it had
no power to do could not be made the predicate for a recovery
against it. On the other hand, if the contested sections of the Alabama Constitution did empower the board to register the plaintiffs,
its refusal to do so was a determination that the plaintiffs lacked the
requisite qualifications of an elector. Since such a determination is
judicial in nature, the board was not liable in damages. The same
Scylla- and Charybdis-like fate met the bringing of the mandamus
action. Since the sections of the constitution that were assailed also
39 I. at 488.
40

Id. at 493, without opinion.

41 Ibid.
42 Giles v. Teasley, 136 Ala. 164 (1903).
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created the board of registrars, fixed tenure of its members, and
defined their duties, a declaration that these sections were void
would leave no board to exercise those very duties which the
mandamus was sought to compel.4 In an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Day, the Supreme Court dismissed the writs of error in
both cases on the ground that the Alabama court had decided them
on adequate state grounds.44 Mr. Justice McKenna concurred in
the result and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, both without opinion.
Those who took the Giles cases as pointing a way to a solution
of the franchise problem were to be disappointed eleven years later
when similar clauses in the Oklahoma Constitution and the special
act of the Maryland legislature governing the City of Annapolis
were challenged in two cases brought under the enforcement acts
as amended. In Guinn v. United States45 the Court upheld a criminal conviction of two Oklahoma election officials for failure to
register Negroes, and in Myers v. Anderson 0 affirmed verdicts
awarded by a jury in an action for damages brought against election officials by Negroes denied the right to register under the
Maryland statute.
In both cases the question of the validity of the "grandfather
clauses" was squarely raised and decided. The Maryland and Oklahoma provisions were even more thinly disguised than the Alabama classifications. The former gave automatic eligibility for
registration to "citizens who .. .prior to January 1, 1868, were
entitled to vote in this state or any other state of the United States
at a state election, and the lawful male descendants of such persons." 47 The Oklahoma provision was in substance the same. 48
While in Alabama only the existing-not the future-white population was covered in, the distinction would be maintained indefinitely under these two provisions. The Court had no trouble finding
43

Giles v. Teasley, 136 Ala. 228 (1903).

44 Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904). The cases were heard together in the
Supreme Court. See RoBERTsoN & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTON OF THE SupREME COURT

§ 298 n. 3 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
45 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
46 238 U.S. 368 (1915).

47 Md. Laws 1908, ch. 525, at 347.
48

OxA. CONST. art. Hr, S 4a (1910).
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these provisions in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In
49
Guinn, Mr. Justice White stated, in one of his typical sentences:
Indeed, there seems no escape from the conclusion that to hold
that there was even possibility for dispute on the subject
would be but to declare that the Fifteenth Amendment not only
had not the self-executing power which it has been recognized
to have from the beginning, but that its provisions were wholly
inoperative because susceptible of being rendered inapplicable
by mere forms of expression embodying no exercise of judgment and resting upon no discernible reason other than the
purpose to disregard the prohibitions of the Amendment by
creating a standard which on its face was in substance but a
revitalization of conditions which when they prevailed in the
past had been destroyed by the self-operative force of the
Amendment.
In the Myers case it was argued that the Fifteenth Amendment did
not apply to limit the power of the state to establish voting qualifications for electors in municipal elections, and that it was beyond
the amending power to do so. This contention received not so much
as a nod from the Court.
As a sequel to the Guinn case, the Oklahoma legislature was
called into "emergency session," and enacted a statutory substitute
for the constitutional provisions invalidated by the Court. The substitute excused all persons who had registered under the invalidated
provisions from re-registration. All others were given seven days
from the effective date of the Act to register. Those failing to
register within the prescribed seven-day period lost their eligibility
forever.5 0 Lane v. Wilson 1 held this substitute unconstitutional. In
an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court ruled that it made
no difference that there was no technical denial of the right to vote.
Racial discrimination in matters connected with the franchise was
enough.
3. The white primary cases. Unsuccesful in their attempts to
neutralize the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment by periphrasis, southern Democratic party leaders retreated to efforts to
preserve white-voter solidarity within the party by excluding
Negroes from the nominating processes. While the "grandfather
238 U.S. at 363-64.
51307 U.S. 268 (1938).
49

50 Okla. Laws 1916, ch. 24, § 4.
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clause" cases tested the reach of the constitutional language "on
account of race," the white primary cases explored the terms "right
to vote" and "by any state." No circumlocution was involved.
Negroes were specifically excluded. The argument for validity
rested upon the contention that participation in primary elections
is not encompassed within the term "right to vote" as employed in
the Fifteenth Amendment. The first of these cases to reach the
Court was Love v. Griffth.5 In Love, since the exclusion was accomplished by a rule adopted by the Democratic executive committee of Houston, the question of "state action" was also presented. The rule in question was adopted for a single election, and
by the time the case reached the Court that election had already
been held. The Court avoided all the issues by holding that the
cause was moot.
In 1923 the Houston exclusion rule was incorporated into the
statutes of Texas: "[I]n no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election held in the State of
Texas."53 Here was no problem of definitions: Negroes were called
Negroes. Here was no problem of the limits of private action: the
rule was incorporated in a statute of the state. Instead, the statute
presented the naked problem whether "right to vote" includes the
right to vote in party primaries. Even so, the Court did not find it
necessary to rule on the matter. Mr. Justice Holmes stated in Nixon
v. Herndon 4 that the statute was so patent a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Court
need not consider whether or not it deprived the plaintiffs in error
of their right to vote: "States may do a good bit of classifying that
it is difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too
clear for extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of
a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this case."
This holding shifted the southern Democrats' probe for soft
spots in the Fifteenth Amendment from the term "the right to
vote" to the term "by any state." The offending provisions of the
Texas laws governing primary elections were repealed; in their
stead the legislature adopted a provision that left to the executive
committee of the party the adoption of rules governing eligibility
52 266 U.S. 32 (1924).
53 TEXAS CODE, art. 3093a (1923).

54 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
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to participate in the primaries. Exclusionary regulations adopted
under this statute were upset in Nixon v. Condon5 by a decision of
five to four. For the majority Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that Texas
had repealed none of its detailed regulations governing primary
elections. In viewing the system as one in which the state had delegated to the party executive committee a rule-making power, he
held that the discharge of such delegated authority constituted
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Herndon was
deemed controlling and no mention was made of the Fifteenth
Amendment, though the case, like Gomillion, raised questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, for the dissenters, rested his opinion on the absence
of "state action," taking the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
alike to require discrimination by the state.58
The Fifteenth Amendment was not squarely considered until
Grovey v. Townsend5 7 in 1934. Grovey involved the same protracted dispute that had been before the Court in Herndon and
Condon, testing a third state effort to effect a constitutional exclusion of Negroes from participation in the party primaries. This
third effort consisted in repealing all legislation on the subject and
leaving the matter to the party. For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice
Roberts held that, absent the delegation found in Condon, exclusion under a party rule was not "state action" and did not offend
either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
Nine years later, in Smith V. Allwfight, 58 the Court reversed

Grovey v. To.nsend and held for the first time that the right to
participate in the party primary elections is encompassed within the
"right to vote" as used in the Fifteenth Amendment, and that, in
national elections, the "right to vote" is a privilege or immunity of
citizens of the United States. "State action" was found in the fact
that since the decision in Grovey, the Court had recognized in
United States v. Classic59 that primary elections are a part of the
machinery for the selection of candidates, and as such are fused
with the general election into one constitutionally protected
55 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
56 Id.at $9.
59

57 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

58 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

313 U.S. 299 (1941). See Dunham, Mr. Cbief Justice Stone, in MB. Jusice 51-

53 (Dunham & Kurland ad. 1956).
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process. In Terry v. Adams,60 eleven years later, the doctrine of

Smith v. Allwright was extended to cover a preprimary election
held without sanction of statute and financed by assessing the
candidates. The Court split three ways over the ground for characterizing such an activity as "state action," but eight of the nine
justices so characterized it.
4. Miscellaneous classifications. In the "grandfather clause"
cases, it has been noted, the invalidity was predicated upon the
application to Negroes of standards not equally applied to whites.
The validity of the standards themselves was not litigated in those
cases, but it was generally assumed that, absent discriminatory application, they would be sustained, even though statistically they
might have the effect of excluding more Negroes than whites.
Among these provisions were poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting,
and disqualification
property qualifications, literacy requirements,
61
crimes.
specified
of
upon conviction
60 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
61

The poll tax as a prerequisite to voting, disqualification for conviction of listed
crimes, and a requirement that an applicant for registration should be able to read
any section of the Constitution or be able to understand the same or give a reasonable
interpretation thereof, were upheld in Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
The appellant attempted to show evil intention by quoting from the opinion of the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247 (1896): 'Within the field
of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution, the
convention swept the field of expedients, to obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the
negro race .... By reason of its previous condition of servitude and dependencies,
this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of temperament,
and of character, which clearly distinguished it as a race from the whites.... Restrained by the Federal Constitution from discriminating against the negro race,
the convention discriminates against its characteristics and the offenses to which its
criminal members are prone." For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice McKenna said:
"But nothing tangible can be deduced from this. If weakness were to be taken advantage of, it was to be done 'within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution,' and the means of it were the alleged
characteristics of the negro race, not the administration of the law by the officers of
the State. Besides, the operation of the constitution and laws is not limited by their
language or effects to one race. They reach weak and vicious white men as well as
weak and vicious black men, and whatever is sinister in their intention, if anything,
can be prevented by both races by the exertion of that duty which voluntarily pays
taxes and refrains from crime." 170 U.S. at 222.
The Williams case was mentioned by President Goode in this address to the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901 in commending to the attention of the convention the Mississippi and South Carolina provisions, see supra note 35, and no
doubt was in the mind of the late Carter Glass when, speaking before the same con-
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The educational requirements have been successful except where
their terms and legislative history have indicated that they were
designed for discriminatory application,12 or where discriminatory
administration has been demonstrated.63 The property qualifications have never been squarely before the Court. Once it became
apparent that they could not be applied to Negroes without also
being applied to whites, these provisions rapidly disappeared in the
South.
B. THE GOMILLION CASE

The Fifteenth Amendment, then, is self-executing and automatically invalidates provisions in state constitutions and state
statutes which violate its terms. It applies to legislative and administrative action alike.64 It applies to all levels of government, federal,
state, and local. It prohibits indirect as well as direct exclusions.
Indeed, there need be no exclusion at all; the Amendment prohibits
"discrimination on account of race in matters affecting the franchise," 65 and is not restricted to situations in which there is a technical denial of the right to vote. It prohibits exclusion of citizens on
the basis of their race from participation in the elective process at
all stages. It prohibits willful failure to count the ballots from certain precincts chosen because of the racial composition of their
voters. 66
vention, he observed: "By fraud, no; by discrimination, yes. But it will be discrimination within the letter of the law... Discrimination! Why that is precisely what
we propose; that, exactly, is what this convention was elected for-to discriminate to
the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every Negro voter who can be gotten
rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white
electorate .... It is a fine discrimination, indeed, that we have practiced in this
plan." Quoted in LEvmnsoN,RACF, CLAss Aim PARTY 85-86 (1932), and in KEY,PoLmAL PARTS AwD PassuR GRouns 535-36 (1946).
02 Compare Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1944), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933
(1949), with Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
63 In Williams, supra note 61, at 224-25, the Court noted that under Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a showing of actual discrimination in administration
would suffice to bring such a law within the prohibition of the Constitution.
64
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
65
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,274 (1938).
66 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S.383 (1915).
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Comprehensive as these principles are in their coverage of situadons in which whites seek to limit Negro participation in the elective process, they all derive from cases in which the effect of the
challenged provisions or individual acts was to deny to the moving
party, or to limit, his right to participate in the processes by which
were chosen officers in a unit of government with power over his
life, liberty, or property. They do not cover the right to be within
the governmental units themselves. In this regard, the Gomillion
case is one of novel impression.
The "vested" vote-an arithmetic solution.Before the changes in
the boundaries of the City of Tuskeegee, Negroes who were qualified electors and resided within the city limits were entitled to vote
in national, state, county, and city elections. Though efforts to
hold down Negro registration had been effective in the past, they
were clearly illegal and subject to judicial correction. After the
Tuskeegee gerrymander, those who lived in the area detached from
the city could still vote in national, state, and county elections. By
ignoring the question raised by Mr. Justice Whittaker and simply
asserting that the petitioners were deprived of their "theretofore
enjoyed" voting rights, the Court left the inference that the question was a matter of simple arithmetic. Petitioners were entitled to
four votes; now they are entitled to three. Four minus three equals
one. They have lost a vote.
There are several difficulties with this approach to the question.
The first is factual. The Negroes excluded from Tuskeegee could
have incorporated their own city. The Alabama statutes provide
that any area inhabited by seventy-five persons or more, which is
contiguous and forms a homogeneous settlement or community,
may incorporate as a city or town by presenting to the probate
judge of the county a petition signed by twenty-five inhabitants."'
In such a community the petitioners, representing a clear majority
of the registered voters, could choose the form of government under which they wish to be governed, would be free from the obligations which the old city might have incurred, would not be subject
to the minority control to which they had been subject in the past,
67 ALA. CODE tit. 37,

art. 6 (1958).
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and, in any event, would have four votes.68 Any arithmetic loss of
vote would then be ephemeral. What would be lost would be the
"right" to be included in the general-function local government
unit that remained within the Tuskeegee city limits.
The second difficulty is doctrinal. Since the right to vote in Tuskeegee is not a right that in the nature of things can be shared by all
Alabamans, the problem arises: where did these particular citizens
get the right "heretofore enjoyed?" The City of Tuskeegee did not
exist in a state of nature. It was created under the laws of Alabama.
It was made square by the laws of Alabama. 69 Its powers were dele-

gated by the Alabama legislature. To say that a change in the
boundaries deprives the persons resident in the detached area of
their vote carries with it the necessary inference that the legal act of
the state in creating a city vests in its inhabitants rights to continued
exercise of the powers granted under the charter; the right to vote
in the affairs of a municipal corporation is simply appendent to the
powers conferred under the charter or by general law. The Contract Clause cases cited by the Court as demonstrating that the
powers to alter municipal boundaries is not absolute, 70 do not suggest that the residents of a municipality acquire any rights to the
08 At the time of the passage of Act 140, there was widespread discussion of this
possibility. Legislation was proposed to forestall it, but it failed of passage. See
generally HALL, BmLIOGRAPmiY or Tm TusE.mm G8YMANDER PROTEST (1960).
09 Boundaries of municipal corporations are not a natural phenomenon. In the
session of the Alabama legislature which enacted Act 140, forty-nine other Acts
were passed fixing such boundaries. Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that Act 140
was not an act "merely describing metes and bounds." Of course it was not; neither
is any other such act. The fixing of boundaries of this sort is a process of maneuvering and bargaining for inclusion and exclusion and results very often in shapes as
strange as that of the new city of Tuskeegee. In Alabama, Birmingham has over a
hundred sides, including some very fancy jigs and jogs, while Jacksonville, being
completely round, has only one. In Chicago this year, the city council will carve
the city into fifty wards and in the process it can be assumed that half a dozen racial, national, and religious groups will fight to preserve or increase their influence
in the city's affairs. Though there may be differences between the fixing of representation boundaries and general-function boundaries (see pp. 234-39 infra), the
shape of the average American city suggests that there is about as much politics involved in one as the other.
70

Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646
(1897); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S.
514 (1879); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 260 (1876).
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continued exercise of the powers delegated to the corporation,
either in substance or in geographical extent. Under Brown v.
Board of Education71 Negroes may not be systematically segregated for educational purposes. It may follow that the power of the
state to fix school district boundaries does not permit the accomplishment of such systematic segregation through gerrymandering.
This is not to say, however, that a Negro child transferred from
one public school to another-absent a showing of segregation-is
deprived of his right to attend the first public school. The evil to
be eliminated is the segregation, not the move from one school to
another.
The loss-of-vote analysis is wanting in a third way. Not only is
it factually and doctrinally difficult to spell out a loss of the right
to vote in the Gomillion case, but clearly the desired objective
could have been obtained without "a loss of vote" even in the
strained sense in which it can be found in the detachment case. The
municipal charter could have been forfeited, thereby occasioning a
loss of municipal vote to Negro and white alike and answering the
charge of racial discrimination. Then, under the general law, the
same twenty-eight-sided city could have been incorporated. 72 If

it

be said that the Court would penetrate the underlying rationale of
this sequence of events and strike this method down as artifice, the
residents of "uncouth" new Tuskeegee could detach their area
from the city. Here the white population, not the Negro, would
suffer any temporary loss of vote involved. Then they could pettion the county probate court to decree their incorporation. This
latter method would not only have the effect of accomplishing the
same separation accomplished temporarily by the Tuskeegee gerrymander, but it would also have the further effect of saddling the
Negro community with the outstanding obligations of the old
city.7 3 Had the very statute held unconstitutional in Gomillion

been enacted in Virginia instead of in Alabama, the Court could
not have spelled out any loss of vote in the arithmetic sense, for in
Virginia the cities are independent political entities, not governed
71347 U.S. 483 (1954).

72 See pp. 236-37 infra.
73

See, e.g., Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
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by the counties in which they are geographically located. 74 Detachment of a portion of the City of Charlottesville, for instance, would
occasion no loss in the number of votes cast by persons in the area
detached. They would no longer vote for the Charlottesville councilmen, but instead would vote for members of the Albemarle
County Board.
Thus Gomillion invites speculation as to why the Court put its
decision on the ground that there was an unequivocal loss of a
vote. The easiest answer lies in the way the complaint was framed.
The Court seems to have taken at face value the allegations of facinorous motive, characterizing the case as one in which the authors of the new boundaries carefully identified the Negro voters
and carved their homes out of the city. If the case depends upon
this characterization, the result is understandable. The characterization itself, however, may very well depend upon the failure of the
petitioners to provide before-and-after figures on Negro residence
as well as Negro voter residence. If, as has been suggested, there
were some 400-odd Negroes left in the new city, and among them
there were four or five qualified electors, while 5,400-odd Negroes
were excluded, among whose number there were 395-odd qualified
electors, the ratio of voters to gross number is still close enough to
suggest that no such detailed excision occurred and that what happened was an exclusion, willy-nilly, of the vast percentage of
Negroes, voters and non-voters.
Another distinct possibility is that the decison covers up disagreements on the validity of the non-justiciability doctrine
espoused by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and two other members of the
Court in Colegrove v. Green. 75 Some credence is lent to this view
by the fact that, without mentioning South v. Peters7 6 the Court
distinguished the apportionment cases as involving mere dilution.
Furthermore, it would account for Mr. Justice Douglas' felt necessity to note that he still adheres to the views of the dissents in Colegrove and South.
74 SeeBain, Terms and Condition of Annexation under the 1952 Statute, 41 VA.
L.REv. 1130 (1955).
75 328 U.S. 549 (1946). This case is considered at length in the next part of this

article.
78 339

U.S. 276 (1950). This case, too, is subject to extended treatment below.
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The essential problem left open is whether there can ever be a
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment that is not also a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever great need for specifically protecting the franchise may
have existed at the time of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, is it not now clear, as the Equal -Protection Clause has been
construed, that classification in terms of race or color cannot provide a valid basis for state action with regard to any of the rights or
privileges that a state may otherwise regulate? Was the Gomillion
case, because of its specific content, rested on the Fifteenth Amendment which more clearly controlled the issue than the generalities
of the Fourteenth to provide a narrower precedent than might have
otherwise resulted?
II.

THE GoMILLIoN CASE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Constitution of the United States confers no powers on
territorial units smaller than a state. It vests certain powers in the
and reserves the balance "to the states" and
national government
"to the people."'7 7 The Court has said that a state could operate
with no subdivisions at all, managing its affairs and discharging its
dudes completely through state officers. 78 While such a hypothetical monolithic state might not offend the Constitution, there has
never been one in the history of this nation. The first English colonists had been ashore no more than a dozen years before they were
electing representatives to a popular assembly from townships and
boroughs, 79 and by 1634, the colony was divided into eight counties,
"to be governed as the shires in England."8 10 Within another twenty
years one of these counties was given a measure of self-government.81
It can be said, then, that by the middle of the seventeenth century
geographical subdivisions were in use in America for purposes of:
(1) representation in the governing body of the larger political
order; (2) local administration of state policy; and (3) the exercise
of delegated powers of self-government.
Properly viewed, geographical subdivision is not a matter of sub713. S. CoNsT. amend. X.
78 See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
79 See 1 Laws of Virginia 121 (Hening 1619).
80

1d.at 223 (1634).

81 Id.
at 391 (1655).
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stantive power, but rather a method of accomplishing diverse governmental objectives; hence its limits may be expected to vary with
the substantive power in the exercise of which it is employed. To
place Gomillionin this context, it is useful to examine the substantive constitutional rights to equality of representation, equality in
opportunities for local self-government, and equality in government services.
A. GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES AND REPRESENTATION

In a sort of Kinsey Report appended to his opinion in Colegrove
v. Green,82 Mr. Justice Frankfurter demonstrated that apportionment, like sex, is an arena of American life with a chasm between
ethic and action. Forty-two of fifty state constitutions require census apportionment, 3 but most go sinfully on with representation
districts in gross disproportion to population. Sin is seldom free
from strain, however, and the political battles over reapportionment have been among our most strenuous. Political losers yearn to
go to law, and courts at both the state and the national level have
from time to time been asked to intervene.
1. Federal elections. The cases brought before the national
courts have been of two classes. The first consists of those dealing
with the use of districts in the apportionment of representatives in
the Congress, and with the election of senators and presidential
electors. The distribution of representatives is a product of two
apportionments. The Congress is required by the Constitution to
apportion House membership among the states "according to their
respective numbers,"184 and during most of our history Congress has
required that each state apportion its delegation among election
districts."" Though there have been periods during which Congress
refused or neglected to reapportion among the states,86 the courts
82 328 U.s. 539 (1946).
83 See Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAMv.L. Rv.
1057 (1958).
84 US.CoNsr.

I, § 4; Amend. XIV, § 2.

85 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,555 (1946).
SO Ibid. See also Chafee, Conzgressio'nal Reapportionment, 42 HAmv. L. Rnv. 1015

(1929).
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have never been asked to require it to do so, 87 nor has any act of
Congress apportioning representatives been challenged for failure
to comply with the Constitution.88
For the first century and a quarter of our history under the Constitution, the legality of a state law providing for the apportionment of congressional districts was not challenged in federal
courts. The first case, in 1932, was Wood v. Broom,89 in which a
bill was brought before a three-judge district court to declare unconstitutional and void an act of the Mississippi legislature dividing
the state into districts for the purpose of selecting the Mississippi
congressional delegation for that year. It was alleged that the districts created by the statute were not compact and contiguous and
of reasonably equal population, as required by the Constitution and
the applicable Acts of Congress.
The district court held, one judge dissenting, that the Act of
191111 required that congressional districts be compact and contiguous and reasonably equal in population, that the districts
created by the Mississippi statute did not comply, that the voters
had a constitutional right to vote for members of Congress, that the
constitutional right to vote is a right to vote at a legal election, and
that an election held under a void statute is not a legal election. It
proceeded to enjoin the holding of the election.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the district
court was reversed and the bill was ordered dismissed. The Court
was unanimous in its judgment but disagreed as to the appropriate
rationale. For the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes held that the
requirements of the Act of Congress of 1911 that districts be compact and contiguous and of equal population, had expired with the
election they were enacted to govern,9 1 had been omitted from the
8

7 No such apportionment was made between the censuses of 1911 and 1930. See
Chafee, supranote 86, at 1017.
8
8 In Colegrove, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "It never occurred to anyone that
this Court could issue mandamus to compel Congress to perform its mandatory duty

to apportion:' 328 U.S. at 555.
89 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
9

0Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3,37 Stat. 13.

91

The tide to the Act of 1911 read; "For the apportionment of Representatives in
Congress among the several States under the Thirteenth Census." The Court held
that the Act was limited in its application to that particular census. 287 U.S. at 6.
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Reapportionment Act of 1929,92 and were no longer in force. The
Court reserved judgment on the question whether, were these provisions still in force, the issue would be justiciable or whether there
was equity in the bill. Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo were of the opinion that, because the parties and the district
court had all operated under the assumption that the 1911 statute
applied, the Court should not have ruled upon its applicability but
should have reversed the decree and ordered the bill dismissed for
93
want of equity.
It is interesting to speculate about the scope of the decision in
Wood v. Broom and about the relationship between the majority
and concurring opinions. If the issue before the Court is taken as
limited to the propriety of the ground upon which injunctive relief
was granted by the district court, it can be said that the decision
goes no further than to hold that the provisions of §3 of the Reapportionment Act of 1911 expired with the specific apportion-

ment those provisions were enacted to govern. On this point the
record is somewhat confusing. The question whether §3 of the Act
of 1911 was still in force had been expressly reserved the year before in Smiley v. Holm.94 In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court of

Illinois95 and the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky96 had held that the 1911 Act was still effective. It was natural, then, to place heavy emphasis upon the requirements of the
statute. Reading the record, however, it is difficult to draw the con-

clusion that the constitutional question was not specifically raised
and argued. The appellee's brief alleged that the Mississippi Act
was "void and invalid, as being in violation of Art. 1, sec. 4 of the
Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment thereof, and the Act of
Congress of August 8, 1911 .... ,,97 The statement of facts concludes: 98 "On these facts the complainant and appellee seeks protection in the Federal Court of the right of equal representation
guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States and the
92

Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 16, 27.

9 287 U.S. at 8.

94 285 U.S. 355 (1932).

95

148 (1932).
Moran v. Bowley, 347 M11.
Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky. 1932), rev'd sub nom. Mahan v.
Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932), as moot and on the authority of Wood v. Broom.
97 Brief for Appellee, p. 4.
98 Id. at 6.
96
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Act of Congress hereinbefore quoted." In his discussion of equity
jurisprudence, the appellee asserted: 9 "The question involved in
this case is not only the equal right of the appellee to vote in a legal
Congressional Election but his right to equal representation in Congress.... Our Constitution provides that every citizen is entitled to
equal protection of the laws." Later, in the same section: 100 "Therefore the questions whether or not the power was exercised by the
'legislature' within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. 4 (U.S. Const.) and
whether the exercise of the power is within, or complies with, such
federal constitutional provisions and statutory laws, are federal
questions.... This court has stated that when essential to the enforcement of rights asserted under the federal Constitution, it will
review the decision of a state court. . .. It must necessarily follow
that the right of the appellee to participate in the election of a congressman from the State of Mississippi is a right to flow to him out
of the Constitution of the U.S ..... "It may be conceded that the
grounds for relief are in places logically intertwined and difficult of
separation. Nowhere does the appellee concede arguendo the inapplicability of § 3 of the Act of 1911. It could be argued that his
references to Article I, § 4 of the Constitution, and the general references to the Fourtenth Amendment, point to the power of Congress to require compactness and equal population in congressional
election districts. This interpretation, however, cannot be extended
to cover the reference to the Equal Protection Clause, since that
provision is inapplicable to acts of Congress. 1' 1
The majority opinion noted that Article I, § 4 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the statutory provisions, were alleged to be grounds for invalidity. 102 Since the district court decree was reversed and the bill ordered dismissed, it
might be assumed that the decision held that, absent congressional
statute, there is no constitutional right to compel the election of
congressmen from districts that are compact and contiguous and
of reasonably equal population. Under this interpretation the questions of justiciability and equity that were reserved could only
arise in the event that compactness, contiguity, and equality were
99

Id. at 16, 17.

100 Id. at 18, 19.

101 But cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
102

287 U.S. at 4.
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required by statutes enacted by the Congress pursuant to the
powers conferred under the Constitution.
The reach and purpose of the concurring opinion is also ambiguous. The concurring justices may have doubted the merits of the
Court's holding on the expiration of the Act of 1911, and desired to
postpone a decision on that question until it should arise in a case in
which it was contested and argued in the lower court. Lending
credence to this view is the fact that such a case, Mahan v. Hume, 03
had been filed just before Wood v. Broom was decided. The defendant in the Wood case had not urged the inapplicability of the
statute in the district court and did not raise it in the Supreme
Court. The plaintiff, of course, asserted the statute was applicable
and argued its applicability in his brief.104 The only contrary argument was made in a brief amicus filed by the Attorney General of
Virginia. 10 5 The interest of the Commonwealth of Virginia in
Broom grew out of a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals holding a Virginia reapportionment statute unconstitutional under the Virginia Constitution and invalid under the provisions
of the Act of Congress of 1911.106 The Virginia brief was filed on
October 12. Five days later the appeal in Mahan v. Hume 07 was
filed. In the Mahan case, the applicability of the statute, as well as
its constitutionality, had been directly decided in the affirmative.
The concurring Justices may have thought that it made more sense
to reach the merits after argument in a case in which the point was
contested and decided than to do so at the instance of an amicus
curiae, who, in effect, was asking review of a decision of a state
court that could not be appealed because it was supported by a
08
sufficient and independent state ground.

Contemporaneous comment on Wood v. Broom does not add
greatly to understanding. Its impact was neatly summed up in a law
103

287 U.S. 575 (1932).

104 Brief

for Appellee, p. 22.

105 287 U.S. at 4.
1 0

o Brown v. Sanders, 139 Va. 28 (1932). Though the Virginia Court noted the
decisions holding that the provisions of the Act of 1911 were still in force, it held
that since those provisions and the requirements of the Constitution of Virginia
were the same, it did not have to pass on the statutory question.
107 287 U.S. 96 (1932).
108 See ROBERTSON & KnumAm, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 98.
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review note: 109 "It seems that the courts have encountered great difficulty in answering the question as to the individual's right to invoke the power of courts to protect his constitutional rights, and
that the law as to the requirements for constitutional redistricting
is in an unsatisfactory uncertain state." And so it was. And so it
has remained. Attack on unequal districts, unsuccessful in the federal courts, shifted back to the state courts and, by and large, unequal districts grew more unequal. During the period between 1932
and 1946, Wood v. Broom was cited only once, by the Supreme
Court of Illinois." 0 The Illinois court interpreted the Wood case to
hold that there are no requirements of equal population in the
design of congressional districts, either under the Fourteenth
Amendment or under the Act of 1929.
Such was the state of the law at the time Colegrove v. Green"'
reached the Court. Immediately after the census of 1930, the Illinois legislature enacted its first reapportionment statute since
1901.112 The act was attacked in the Illinois courts as failing to

comply with the requirements of compactness and equal population found in the Act of Congress of 1911. The Illinois Supreme
Court invalidated the 1931 statute but held that the result was to
leave in force the Act of 1901.113 The 1901 statute was then
attacked on the same ground but in the meantime the Supreme
Court's decision in Wood v. Broom had been handed down. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act of 1901 met the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and those of the Act
of 1929 as those requirements were explained in the Wood case.1 ' 4
Colegrove was a suit brought in the federal district court for a
declaratory judgment that the Illinois Apportionment Act of 1901
was unconstitutional and in violation of the requirements set out in
various acts of Congress, and for an injunction prohibiting holding
the Illinois congressional elections for 1946 under the provisions of
the Act of 1901. The effect of such an injunction would have been
109 Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 322 (1933).

110 Daly v. Madison County, 378 IM.357 (1941). See Brief and Argument for Appelants, pp. 20-22, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
112 11. Acts. 1931, at 545.
Ill 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"13 IM. Acts 1901, at 3.
114 Daly v. Madison County, 378 l. 357 (1941).
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to require election of Illinois' twenty-six congressmen-at-large until
such time as the General Assembly should enact a constitutional
apportionment act. The plaintiffs elaborately argued the requirements of Article I, §2, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Preamble
to the Constitution of the United States."x5 They also argued that,
while it might be taken as settled that §3 of the Act of 1911 had expired, 116 the statutory requirement of equality of population in
congressional districts could be found in §23 of the Revised Statutes
of 1878.117 It was argued that in printing the United States Code of
1925, § 23 of the Revised Statutes had been inadvertently left out,
and the language of "the obviously temporary Act of 1911" had
been substituted."" They also urged on the Court the Northwest
Ordinance, 119 the Act of 1818 admitting Illinois to the Union, 20
and the original and current Illinois Constitutions.' 2 '
The cause was heard by a three-judge district court which dismissed on the authority of Wood v. Broom. In dismissing, the court
emphasized its disagreement with the holding in the Wood case
and said that but for that decision it would have no hesitation in
granting the relief sought, since it would have supposed that the
right to equal voice in the selection of the state's congressmen was
vouchsafed by the Constitution. It took Wood v. Broom as governing the case on the constitutional ground-the same interpretation
that had been placed upon Wood by the Illinois Supreme Court.2 2
When Colegrove v. Green reached the Supreme Court, only one
Justice who had sat in Wood v. Broom was still on the Court, a fact
115 See also Brief of Better Government Association, as amicus curiae, p. 32;
Lewis, supra note 83, at 1071 et seq., where Article I, § 2 is also used to buttress arguments for the existence of a constitutionally protected right to equal influence in
elections.
116 This was conceded in view of the fiat ruling on the point in Wood v.Broom,
but the appellants attached as an appendix to the brief excerpts from the congressional debate on the Apportionment Act of 1929, purporting to show that no one
thought it had the effect of deleting the 1911 requirement of equal population
among districts. Brief and Argument for Appellants, Appendix, p. 22.
7Id. at 105.
"19 Id.
at 113.
118

Id. at 109.

120 Id. at

121 Id. at

117, 122.

122 Daly

v. Madison County, 378 Ill.
357 (1941).

116.
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adverted to in the opinion of the district court. This was Mr. Chief
Justice Stone, and he died between the argument and the decision.
Since Mr. Justice Jackson did not participate in the case, it was decided by a seven-judge Court. The Court voted four to three to
affirm the district court's dismissal of the bill. There were three
opinions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke for himself and Justices Burton
and Reed, a majority of those voting to affirm. He characterized
the case as one alleging, as grounds for invalidity of the Illinois
statute of 1901, "various provisions of the United States Constitution and § 3 of the Reapportionment Act of August 8, 1911. "1123 He
went on to say that the Court could dispose of the case on the authority of Wood v. Broom, which had settled the legal merits of
the controversy inasmuch as it had held that § 3 of the Act of 1911
had expired and that the Act of 1929 did not contain any requirement of equality of population among districts. 124 This can be
taken as adopting the view of the Illinois Supreme Court and of the
district court in the Colegrove case, that Wood v. Broom held that
no guaranty of equal congressional districts flows directly from
Article I, §4 or from the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter did not stop there. He called attention to the fact that
in Wood v. Broom four Justices were of the opinion that the bill in
that case should have been dismissed for want of equity. Recognizing the intricacies of party fights and local geographical bargaining,
he was of the opinion that the Court was well out of that "political
thicket.' 125 This opinion was shared by Mr. Justice Rutledge, who
said that initially he should have thought that the holding on the
absence of justiciable constitutional rights was also correct, inasmuch as §§ 4 and 5 of Article I apparently set out an exclusive
method of correcting such abuses, but that he took Smniley v.
Holm 28 to hold the contrary. Therefore he concurred in the
result, agreeing that the bill should be dismissed for want of equity;
he thought the question otherwise justiciable and expressed no
opinion on the merits of the constitutional issue.127
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, dis123

328 U.S. at 550.

124 1d.

at 551.

125

Id. at 556.

126 285 U.S. 355 (1932).

127 328 U.S. at 564.
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sented.12 He took the creation of unequal districts to violate the
Equal Protection Clause and saw no difficulty in enforcement of a
decree through a requirement that congressional elections be held
at large until such time as the Illinois General Assembly should pass
a valid reapportionment statute. This method might not be ideal,
he conceded, but it had the virtue of being constitutional.129
The difference in treatment of Wood v. Broom as a precedent in
the Frankfurter and Black opinions is of interest. It has been suggested above that the case can be taken as ruling that there are no
constitutionally protected rights to equal congressional districts.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was careful, however, to preserve the
issue whether illegality in the creation of such districts is a justiciable matter. Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter was willing to
answer in the negative, leaving the inference that, should Congress
require by statute that congressional districts be of equal population, the Court would not intervene and the matter would be left
for Congress to handle through its contested-election machinery.
This is the point on which Mr. Justice Rutledge parted company
with the other Justices who voted to affirm. It must be said with
Mr. Justice Rutledge that it is very difficult, indeed, to reconcile
the Frankfurter position with the holding in Smiley v. Holm.
Mr. Justice Black took the narrowest possible view of Wood v.
Broom. Ignoring the fact that the constitutional point was raised,
argued, and stated by the Court as among the grounds urged for
invalidating the Mississippi statute, and though the holding is completely inconsistent with the theory that the constitutional question
was not decided, he stated: 18 0 "There this Court simply held that
the State Apportionment Act did not violate the Congressional Reapportionment Act of 1929, 46 Star. 21, 26, 27 since that Act did
not require election districts of equal population. The Court expressly reserved the question of 'the right of complainant to relief
in equity.'" The difficulty with this statement is that so often attendent on quotation of incomplete sentences. What the Court had
said was that it was not necessary to consider "the right of the complainant to relief in equity upon the allegations of the bill of complaint, or as to justiciability of the controversy, if it were assumed
that the requirements invoked by the complainant are still in
128 d. at 566.

1291d. at 574.

130 Id. at 573.
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effect. 1' 3 1 Thus what was reserved was a decision on the willingness
of the Court to intervene to enforce a statutory as distinguished
from a constitutional requirement of election from districts of
equal population.
The Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove, representing a minority of
the Court, is technically not a precedent. On the issue of constitutional entitlement to vote at an election of congressmen from districts of equal population, the Court was split three to three, with
Mr. Justice Rutledge expressing no opinion. On the justiciability
issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion was a minority view, the
Court expressing its opinion four to three for the contrary position.
The constitutional requirements for equality in the election of
congressmen have been before the Court only once since Colegrove
v. Green. In 1946, they were pleaded in an attempt to upset the
Georgia unit voting system. In Cook v. Fortson,32 it was alleged
that in a Democratic primary election for congressman for the fifth
Georgia Congressional District, composed of Fulton (Atlanta),
DeKalb, and Rockdale Counties, one candidate had received a
majority of the votes cast in the election, but that another candidate, having received a majority of the votes cast in two of the
three counties embraced by the district, had been certified as the
Democratic candidate. In denying equitable relief, the district
court took the case to be controlled by Colegrove. In the Supreme
Court the appeal was dismissed, and the district court ordered to
dismiss the bill, on the authority of United States v. Anchor Coal
Co., apparently on the ground of mootness. 133 Justices Black and
Murphy were of the opinion that jurisdiction should have been
noted. Mr. Justice Rutledge favored postponing decision until the
case was heard on the merits. He noted the relevance of Colegrove
3
but indicated that he did not think the issues were identical.1 4
Though Cook v. Fortsonwas the last case to reach the Supreme
Court raising the requirements of Article I, §4, the requirements of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses have been the sub131

287 U.S. at 8. (Emphasis added.)

133

279 U.S. 812 (1929). See RoBERTsoN & KmKHAm, op. cit supra note 44, at § 273

132

329 U.S. 675 (1946).

n.2.
134 Mr. Justice Rutledge wanted the petition for rehearing in Colegrove granted,
gnd Colegrove and Cook v. Fortson set down for argument together. 329 U.S. at 678.
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ject of much subsequent litigation. Without referring to the Wood
case, Mr. Justice Rutledge said in Cook that a majority of the Court
in Colegrove had refused to find that there was a want of jurisdiction and that in his opinion the issues "whether of jurisdiction, discretion in exercising it, or of substantive right..., have not been
35
conclusively adjudicated by prior decisions of this Court."'
In the election of 1948, those issues were back before the Court
in MacDougal v. Green.1 38 Illinois law provided that before any
new party could have its candidates put on the official ballot, it
must submit a petition signed by 25,000 voters: 1 37 "Provided, that
included in the aggregate total of Twenty-five thousand (25,000)
signatures are the signatures of two hundred (200) qualified voters
from at least fifty (50) counties within the state." The Progressive
Party in Illinois sought to run candidates for President, Vice-President, senator, and a variety of state offices. Party organizers presented a petition with the required 25,000 signatures. The state
electoral board found that the petition did not meet the requirement that there be signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at
least 50 counties and denied it. The plaintiffs sought an injunction
against the enforcement of this requirement. The district court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It cited no precedents.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district
court was affirmed by a vote of six to three. The per curiam opinion
38
was signed by five members of the Court:
To assume that political power is a function exclusively of
numbers, is to disregard the practicalities of government. Thus,
the Constitution protects the interest of the smaller against the
greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal representation
to populations. It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for
this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due
process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a state the
power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical
opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not
available to the former. The Constitution-a practical instrument of government-makes no such demands on the states.
135

Ibid.

137

ILL. REV. STA.

130

335 U.S. 281 (1948).

138

335 U.S.

Ch. 46, § 10-2 (1959).

t 283.
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Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, dissented. He saw in the Illinois statute "the same inherent infirmity
as that which some of us saw in Colegrove v. Green."''13 He was of
the opinion that the Illinois statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause; Article II, § 1, governing the voting for electors; Article I,
§ 2, conferring the right of the people to choose their representatives in Congress; and the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for
the direct election of senators. Each of these provisions, according
to the dissenters, vests important political rights, and discrimination
against any group of citizens in the exercise of these rights is a
denial of equal protection.
Mr. Justice Rutledge voted to affirm the district court's denial of
equitable relief but stated again his opinion that in such cases denial
of relief should be placed upon the exercise of discretion, reserving
the substantive constitutional issues.
Cited as authority in MacDougal v. Green were Colegrove v.
Green and Colegrove v. Barrett.40 Since the substantive issues were
resolved, it can hardly be said that MacDougalwas disposed of on
the ground that the issues involved were non-justiciable. The decision went squarely to the absence of any constitutional requirement
that political power in the states be evenly distributed per poll without regard to geography. This is precisely the proposition implicit
in Wood v. Broom, and in the statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green to the effect that the merits of that
controversy had been settled in Wood v. Broom.
Two years later, the Court decided South v.Peters.'4' The same
Georgia unit voting system that had been unsuccessfully attacked
in Cook v. Fortsonwas back before the Court. Under the system, a
number of units was assigned to each county, ranging from six for
each of the eight most populous counties, including Fulton (Atlanta), to two for most counties. In the primary elections for state
officers and for United States senator, the voters in each county
voted for the candidates of their choice and the candidate receiving
the largest number of votes in each county received the number of
139 d.at 289.
140 330 U.S. 804 (1947). Barrett was a companion case to Green and was dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question.
141 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
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units allotted to that county. The very large vote in Atlanta
counted as six units and the vote in the least populous county in the
state counted as two, giving a single Atlanta vote one one-hundredand-twentieth of the influence on the outcome that a single vote in
the least populous county had, and one-tenth of the statewide average. In a suit seeking to enjoin the operation of a Georgia statute providing for the application of the unit system in the counting of votes
in primary elections, the district court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed per curiam on authority of MacDougal v. Green, Colegrove v. Green, and Wood v. Broom. The
opinion contained a somewhat cryptic comment to the effect that,
"Federal Courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers
in cases... arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions," 142 but it is difficult
to view South as other than a decision on the merits.
South v.Peters raised for the first time the question of the use of
the power to define representation district boundaries to impose
discriminations against Negroes in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas took the position
that the incorporation of the unit voting system into the Georgia
law was for the purpose of sapping the influence of Negro voters
by diluting the vote in cities, where Negroes had been able to
achieve suffrage in appreciable numbers, and overcounting the
vote in rural areas, where Negroes had been prevented from voting
by violence and chicanery. This contention was ignored by the
majority. The case was not one brought by or on behalf of Negroes
as a class; if it is true that Atlanta Negroes were hurt by the operation of the unit system, it was a hurt that they shared with a very
large group of whites. Since the system had been in use in Georgia
primaries before Georgia had Negro suffrage, it could hardly be
characterized as invented for purposes of racial discrimination.
2. State elections. The second class of cases deals with the distribution of political power within the framework of state government. The states have been no quicker to reapportion their own
representative districts than they have to reapportion congressional
districts. Indeed, in some instances the districts are the same. This
was true at the time when Colegrove v. Green and a companion
42

1

d.at 277.
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case, Colegrove v. Barrett143 were brought in Illinois to challenge
the validity of the Illinois reapportionment act of 1901. Colegrove
v. Green dealt with congressional districts; Colegrove v. Barrett
attacked the same state statute as unconstitutional because it created
state senate districts unequal in population, allegedly in violation of
the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court dismissed without opinion. The
appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred, but indicated
doubt by placing his vote on the ground that the Court had
refused reconsideration of Colegrove v. Green and had dismissed
the Georgia unit-system cases. In five other attempts to challenge
state reapportionment statutes,1 44 and in one subsequent attempt to
bring into question the Georgia unit system, 145 the Court has
affirmed denials of equitable relief. In each instance the case has
been disposed of by per curiam memorandum decisions.
The constitutional issues involved in the federal election cases
and those raised in attacks on apportionment for state election purposes have a common ground, but are not precisely the same.
Which is the stronger case depends upon the interpretation placed
upon the precedents. If they are read to hold that under Article I,
§ 4, these matters are committed exclusively to Congress and the
failure of the states to meet the requirements of the Constitution
must therefore be resolved by election contests under Article I, § 5
(and presumably the Twelfth Amendment), the state cases are
stronger. No congressional power of revision over state election
districting is provided by the Constitution. There is, therefore, no
143

330 U.S. 804 (1947).

144 Matthews v. Hanley 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991
(1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912
(1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952).
145 Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958). The Hartsfield case was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and the district judge refused to convene a three-judge court to hear the case. Motion for
leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to force the district court to convene the panel was filed in the United States Supreme Court. The motion for
leave to file the petition was denied per curiam. The Chief Justice and Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan were of the opinion that a rule to show cause should

issue.
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question of lack of jurisdiction based on the doctrine of separation
of powers. The Equal Protection Clause is self-executing, and
though Congress is given power to implement its provisions, the
courts have had no hesitation in invalidating state legislation that
transgresses them. Nor can it be said that the subject matter is a
political question in the sense that the guaranty of republican form
of government has been held to be. 146 The Equal Protection Clause
has been invoked to protect voting rights of citizens.
If, as has been suggested here, the congressional apportionment
cases, taken together, have disposed of the substantive constitutional question on a ground other than that of separation of powers,
then the state apportionment cases in which no more is alleged than
geographical inequality in representation fall a fortiori within those
dealing with federal elections. In the latter class of cases, the structure of government provided for in the Constitution is set out in
some detail in the instrument itself. Geographical disproportion is
provided for in the Senate to protect geographical minorities. It
can be argued with some force that equal representation in the
House was designed as an egalitarian balance. In the states, by contrast, there has been tremendous variety in form and design both of
institutions of government and of representation schemes.
These varied in the colonies. 47 They varied under the early state
constitutions. 48 They varied at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 49 They vary now. Not only have old
schemes of representation, which were based upon geography and
gave some areas an influence disproportionate to their population,
survived to this day, but the most recent constitutional changes in
146 See Pacific States Telephone &Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
See also Chafee, supra note 86.
147 See 1 Laws of Virginia 112, 299, 300 (Hening 1621); Fundamental Orders of

Connecticut, No. 8 (1638),

in 1 PooRE, FEnDEaLI AND STATE CoNstn'oNs 195

(1878) (hereinafter 'Poona"); Charter of Connecticut (1662), in I PooRE 253.
148See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1818), in 1 PooRE 260; DEL. CoNST. arts. 3 & 4
(1776), in 1 Pooa 273-74; N.H. CoNsT. part II, §§ 2 & 3 (1784), in 2 PooRa 1284,
1286; MAss. CoNsT. ch. 1, § 1 (1780), in 1 Poo E 961; S.C. CONsT. art. XV (1778), in
2 PooRE 1623; S.C. CONST. §§ 3 & 7 (1790), in 2 PooaE 1628, 1629, 1634; PA. CoNST.
§ 17 (1776), in 2 PooRE 1544; N.Y. CoNsT. arts. IV & V (1777), in 2 Pooa 1333.
49

DEL,. CONST. art. I, §§2 & 3 (1831), in 1 PooRa 290-91; GA. CONST. art. II,
§5 2 & 3 (1868), in 1 PooRE 415-16; VT. CoNsT. art. IV (1836), in 2 Pooa 1883.
1
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representational scheme have abandoned equal representation in the
upper house.' 50
But history has neither dimmed the hopes of the franchise reformers nor dampened their energy. Cases continue to come. In
one, as in Colegrove v. Green, litigation may have provided an
effective nudge to a reluctant state legislature. In Magraw v. Donovan,151 plaintiff sought a declaration that the Minnesota Reapportionment Act of 1913 was invalid as a violation of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, because population changes had
made it operate to deny to voters in the more populous counties
equal representation in the state legislature. Whether by fortune or
design, the case was heard while the Minnesota legislature was in
session. Without adverting to any of the Supreme Court cases dealing with failure to reapportion, the district court refused to grant
the relief sought on the ground that a state remedy was available,
but retained jurisdiction until the legislature should have had an
opportunity to act. The legislature did act, and the case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiffs.
The October Term, 1961, of the Supreme Court wil find two
52
new apportionment cases on the Court's docket: Baker v. Carr,1
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, and Scholle v. Secretary of State, 53 from the Supreme
Court of Michigan. The Baker case raises once again the question
of the availability of federal court remedies for failure of a state
legislature to reapportion state legislative districts in accordance
with the requirements of the state constitution. There the failure
to act allegedly resulted in holding elections under an act providing
for districts that have become grossly disproportionate in population because of the passage of time and shifts in population. The
facts and allegations in Baker are substantially the same as those in
Colegrove v. Barrettand in the state apportionment cases that followed it. In fact, the very statute attacked as unconstitutional in
150 E.g., C~Asw. CoNsT. art. IV, S6, as amended November 3, 1942; MiCH. CoNST.
art. 5, § 2 (1900), as amended by Proposition No. 3 at the general election of
November, 1952.

151 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1959), dismissing for mootness 163 F. Supp. 184
(D. Minn. 1958).
152 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). '53 360 Mich. 1 (1960).

HeinOnline -- 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 230 1961

GOMILLION V. LIGHTFOOT

231

Baker v. Carr was before the Court in Kidd v. McCanless,154 in
which the refusal of the Michigan Supreme Court to interfere was
afflied per curiam. In the Baker case a three-judge court dismissed
the complaint but observed that the failure of the legislature to reapportion resulted in a denial of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It read all the cases
starting with Colegrove v. Green as enunciating a non-intervention
rule, "whether from a lack of jurisdiction or from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration."1 55
The Scbolle case contests the validity under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of a 1952 amendment to the Constitution
of the State of Michigan, fixing permanently a geographical scheme
for the apportionment of state senators. In a five-to-three decision,
the Supreme Court of Michigan dismissed the petition. There were
five opinions.
3. The apportiomnent cases and Gomillion. The apportionment
cases are relevant to Gomillion because of the language in Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green to the effect
that the apportionment of representation among geographic areas
within the state is a political question beyond the cognizance of
the courts, and that even where constitutionally protected rights
to equal treatment are trenched upon, these rights must be vindicated in the legislative forum. However, this ground was unnecessary to the decision of Colegrove, even in the Frankfurter
opinion; was rejected by a majority of the seven Justices who
h ' 5 deheard the case; and is irreconcilable with Smiley v. Holm
cided before Colegrove, and with MacDougal v. Green, decided
after Colegrove.
The apportionment cases can easily be distinguished from
Gomillion. Those cases hold that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not interdict
apportionment schemes that give disproportionate representation
to thinly settled areas. It does not follow that the Fifteenth Amendment does not interdict apportionment schemes that single out
Negroes for discriminatory treatment. The Constitution does not
in its language require equal representation, but it does prohibit the
abridgment as well as the denial of the right to vote which is based
154 352 U.S. 920 (1956).

155 179 F. Supp. at 826.

156 285 U.S. 355 (1931).
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upon racial differences. Even were there no Fifteenth Amendment,
1 57
the same result might be justified.

While the apportionment cases thus contribute little or nothing
to the solution of the Gomillion case, the latter did afford the
Court an excellent opportunity to clarify the former. This opportunity was not taken. Instead, the Court proceeded to make unintelligible that which had been merely obscure. "In no case involving unequal weight in voting distribution that has come before
the Court did the decision sanction a differentiation on racial lines
where approval was given to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote
solely from colored citizens."' 15 This statement was enough to dispose of all the apportionment cases, but Mr. Justice Frankfurter
was unwilling to leave it there. Singling out Colegrove v. Green
from among the apportionment cases cited by the respondents, he
stated that it was decided "on the ground that it presented a subject
not meet for adjudication."' 9 He then characterized the controlling facts of Colegrove:'60 "That case involved a complaint of discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts. The appellants in Colegrove complained only of a dilution of their votes as
a result of legislative inaction over a course of many years." He
contrasted that case with the "decisive facts" alleged and "taken
to be proved" in Gomillion:'61 "The petitioners here complain that

affirmative legislative action deprives them of their votes and the
consequent advantages that the ballot affords." This is bringing
mud to the Mississippi. Were Colegrove v. Green considered in
isolation, perhaps it could be said that it governed only the malapportionment of congressional districts. It cannot be viewed in
isolation, however. Its companion case, Colegrove v. Barrett, was
dismissed on its authority, and Colegrove v. Barrett challenged the
157 See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 272 U.S. 536 (1927). Though it has been said
that Minor v. Happerset 21 Wall. 162 (1811), was limited to the ground alleged
(the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) and does
not stand in the way of an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to forbid
racial discrimination in suffrage matters, it seems clear that the Equal Protection
Clause was not so construed at the time. The Fourteenth Amendment contains
a reduction of representation clause that was substituted for a direct suffrage provision rejected by the Congress. See MArrows, op. cit. supra note 26, at 11-14.
158 364 U.S. at 346.
160 Ibid.
159/Ibid.

161lIbid.
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equality of apportionment for the state senate. Furthermore, McDougal v. Green'6 2 dealt with the selection of presidential and
vice-presidential electors, Turman v. Duckworth 36 with the selection of a governor, South v. Peters" with United States senators,
and Hartsfield v. Sloan 65 with a variety of state officers.
Nor is it possible to say that the decision in Colegrove hinged
upon the fact that the passage of time had accentuated the rural
bias of the Illinois Reapportionment Act of 1901. In the first place,
the appellant in Colegrove was careful to argue that the Act of
1901 was unconstitutional when it was passed. In the second place,
having said that Colegrove was governed by Wood v. Broom, it is
completely inconsistent to say that the disposition of Colegrove
hinged upon the fact that the inequality there considered was the
product of the passage of time. In the Wood case, the Governor's
ink was hardly dry on the statute. In the third place, in neither
MacDougal v. Green, nor South v. Peterswas the alleged inequality
the product of population shifts over a period of years.
In a vain effort to fit the distinction between Colegrove and
Gomillion into the parlance of justiciability, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that "these considerations lift this controversy out of
the so-called 'political' arena and into the conventional sphere of
constitutional litigation."' 66 Certainly the fact that Colegrove dealt
with relative factors that in the nature of things could never be
precisely equal, while Gomillion was characterized by the Court
as showing an unequivocal denial of the right to vote, is a point of
distinction. It is hardly a controlling one. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits abridgment on racial grounds as well as denial.
Suppose that the City of Tuskeegee had been cut along the same
"uncouth" lines, and the white portion of the city cut in two parts,
along with the provision that, in electing the state senator or representative (under a unit system like the one upheld in South v.
Peters), each of the three portions of the city should have one unit.
Is it possible that such "mere dilution" would survive judicial scrutiny? Be this as it may, the distinction between the apportionment
cases and Gomillion properly goes to the scope of constitutional
162

335 U.S. 281 (1948).

163

329 U.S. 675 (1946).

164 339 U.S. 276 (1950).

165 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
166 364 U.S. at 346-47.
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protection, not to the question of justiciability. The racial character of the discrimination alleged in Gomillion is pertinent to the
definition of citizen's rights, even in the "political thicket."
B. GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The apportionment cases came into consideration in Gomillion
at the court of appeals level. In the district court they were not
mentioned at all. This is not surprising in view of the fact that
Gomillion did not involve any inequalities in the design of representation districts. The allegations charged discrimination in fixing
boundaries of a general-function unit of local government.
The district court placed special emphasis upon the case of
Hunterv.Pittsburgh.16 7 In Hunter,citizens of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, sought to reverse a decree directing the consolidation of the
City of Allegheny with the City of Pittsburgh. The consolidation
had been effected under an act of the Pennsylvania legislature that
provided that a vote should be taken in the area encompassed by
both cities and that if the vote favored consolidation, consolidation
should be decreed. The vote was taken and favored consolidation,
but the majority of the Allegheny voters had voted against it. They
contended that the extinguishment of Allegheny by consolidation
was a violation of the Contract Clause, because an implied contract
between the citizens of Allegheny and the city guaranteed that their
tax monies would be spent only for the benefit of Allegheny. They
charged a violation of the Due Process Clause because Allegheny
had already provided its citizens with numerous public improvements and paid for them out of its citizens' pockets, while Pittsburgh was not only heavily in debt but about to contract more
debts which consolidation would inflict on the more cautious citizens of Allegheny. The gist of the complaint was that valuable
assets belonging to the citizens of Allegheny were being sequestered for the use of the Pittsburghers, while all that Pittsburgh
brought to the union was a heavy debt. In rejecting the contention
of the plaintiffs in error, Mr. Justice Moody, for a unanimous Court,
made the classic statement on the relationship between municipal
168
corporations and their creators:

167 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
168 Id. at 178.
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It would be unnecessary and unprofitable to analyze these
decisions or quote from the opinions rendered. We think the
following principles have been established by them and have
become settled doctrines of this Court, to be acted upon
wherever they are applicable. Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies
for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State
as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing
these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given
the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the
State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property, or exempting them
from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the State
within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State,
therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
powers, may take without compensation such property, hold
it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.
All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with
or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their
protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its acts to the state constitution, may
do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution
of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property
owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their
property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased
taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract
or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences. The power is in the State and those who legislate for
the State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.
The district court undoubtedly felt that, with Hunter to sustain its
judgment, the second string of Colegrove was unnecessary. Hunter
suggests that the creation, alteration, and dissolution of municipal
corporations has every element of non-justiciability and every element requiring judicial restraint present in the representativedistrict cases. From the earliest cases, however, the Court has shown
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no reluctance to state simply on the merits that the Constitution of
the United States presents no inhibition to the exercise of free
legislative discretion in fixing general-function boundaries. In distinguishing those cases from Gomillion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
showed why this is so. In the general-function district cases, the
underlying rights allegedly infringed have been the rights to equal
tax treatment and to continued exercise of delegated powers or
management of public property. The cases hold that no such rights
are given by the Constitution of the United States. The Hunter
case presents no inhibition of judicial scrutiny of legislative acts
fixing municipal boundaries and defining municipal powers or dealing with their property. As a decision on the merits, it deals with
the scope of protection under the Constitution.
In demonstrating that Hunter stated no absolutes, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter referred to the long series of cases in which the Court
has applied the Contract Clause to state efforts to rescue hardpressed communities from the results of their foolishness during
the great railroad boom. In many states enabling legislation had
been passed to permit counties, cities, and towns to issue bonds to
raise money for stock-subscription in railroad companies planning
to build lines through the locality. In some instances, the railroads
were never built. In many others the expected growth that the
coming of the railroad promised never took place. A new generation of taxpayers, faced with the burden of paying these bonds,
launched a series of efforts to evade responsibility for the sins of
their fathers.
The first line of defense was the doctrine of ultra Zires. After
this had been rendered difficult by the development in the federal
courts of the counter-doctrine of estoppel by recital, 169 the taxpayers went to the legislatures. The first legislative relief came in the
form of tax limitations. In Von Hoffman v. Quincy,'170 it was held
that the application of tax limitations enacted after the issuance of
bonds cannot be used to defeat an action for mandamus to levy
the tax called for by bonds. Withdrawal of the power to raise the
money to pay the bonds was held to be a violation of the Contract
169 Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (1858); see 2 DmLoN, MurciPAL
CORPORATONS
1704

1424 (5th ed. 1911).

Wall. 535 (1866).
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Clause. The third round in this aftermath of expansive municipal
activity saw the legislative reorganization of municipalities, and
the contention on the part of the new entities that they were not
liable for the debts of the old. Such cases were Broughton v. Pensacola,171 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 72 Mobile v. Watson, 73 and
Shapleigh v. San Angelo. 4 All of them involved efforts to collect
from "successor corporations" the obligations of the predecessor.
In each of these cases a valid debt was established, and the Court
decided that the facts justified holding the defendant to be the
original debtor's successor. In Grahamv. Folsom 7 5 however, there
was a final extinguishment of a township. The Court held that there
were county officers who could levy the taxes required to pay the
township debt, and that mandamus would issue to require them
to do so.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter used these cases under the Contract
Clause to show that the powers spoken of in such broad terms as
in Hunter v. Pittsburgh have limitations. He quoted from Graham
v. Folsom:17 "[Sluch power, extensive though it is, is met and
overcome by the provision of the Constitution of the United States
which forbids a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts." Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued, "If all this
is so in regard to the constitutional protection of contracts, it
should be equally true that, to paraphrase, such power, extensive
though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a state from
passing any law which deprives a citizen of his vote because of
77
his race."'
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Whittaker suggested that
the case was properly characterized as one in which Negroes were
"fenced out" of municipal benefits. This, he said, constituted a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion
rested solely on the fact that in the course of thus being "fenced
out," the petitioners lost a vote hitherto enjoyed in municipal
affairs. Had Mr. Justice Whittaker's view of the case mustered a
17193 U.S. 266 (1876).

172 100 U.S. 514 (1879).

175 200 U.S. 248 (1906).

173 116 U.S. 289 (1886).

176 364 U.S. at 345.

1.74 167 U.S. 646 (1897).

177Ibid.
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majority, the precedent value of Hunter and cognate cases would
have been materially weakened, for though the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted primarily for the protection of racial minorities,
its language is general and its history has paralleled Kipling's lines
from The Ladies: "[T]he things you will learn from the yellow
and brown, they'll 'elp you a lot with the white. "7 By placing
the result on the Fifteenth Amendment, the majority limited the
immediate precedent value of Gomillion to cases of racial discrimination in matters of franchise, leaving intact for the time being
the ruling in Hunter that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
grant, nor is there vested under the9 Contract Clause, a general
right to retain municipal boundaries.17
In what may have amounted to no more than rhetoric, the maj ority opinion did resurrect the dictum in the Hunter case to the
effect that property of a municipality held in its proprietary, as
distinguished from its governmental, capacity might be afforded
different protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 After
full discussion, this dictum was rejected in Trenton v. New Jersey'18 and Newark v. New Jersey. 2 It is a thoroughly unworkable
distinction and it is probable that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was sim178 This despite the doubts of Mr. Justice Miller that "any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.' The
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1872). See the comment of Professors
Currie and Schreter on the limitations of Mr. Justice Miller as a prophet, in UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,28 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 1 (1960).
179 See Texas ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, 355 U.S. 603
(1958). The production company was the owner of mineral leases on submerged
lands. It sued to prevent annexation by the city, claiming that the land could not
be benefited by city services and the only purpose of the annexation was to
enhance the city revenues. The Texas Supreme Court held that under Texas law
annexation is a political question not subject to review. On appeal, the Supreme
Court dismissed per curiam for want of a substantial federal question. No authorities were cited. See Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court:
1957 Term, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 279, 315 (1959).
180 "It will be observed that in describing the absolute power of the State over
property of municipal corporations we have not extended it beyond the property
held and used for governmental purposes.' Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,
179 (1907).
181262 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1923) (Due Process and Contract Clauses).
182 262 U.S. 192 (1923) (Equal Protection Clause).
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ply setting the broad dictum of the Hunter case in its proper perspective, rather than suggesting that the governmental-proprietary
distinction can be applied in such cases.
C. GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AND SERVICES

For a variety of reasons many of the service functions of government are often split off from the general-function political unit.
School districts, sanitary districts, park districts, drainage districts,
and the like, are common in American communities. 183 Some are

financed by revenue bonds and service charges. Others levy their
own taxes. In some cases they are under the control of the generalfunction district; in others they are completely independent corporations. For the purposes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, they are public agencies and their action is "state
action."
The alignment of boundaries of service districts is important in
two respects. It determines who gets the service; it may also determine the allocation of cost. Redistribution of income through imposing a disproportionate tax burden on some, or through disproportionate service to others, is not unknown to American government. No
one cavils at taxing the property of bachelors for the education of
the community's children or at taxing the property of the cripple
for the construction of tennis courts. In the spending of the tax
dollar all that is required is that the object of expenditure serve
some legitimate public purpose, and even here the Supreme Court
has said that the determination of what is a public purpose is primarily a matter of legislative discretion.
Some government activities, though serving a legitimate public
purpose, confer a direct benefit upon particular parcels of real
estate. Where this is so, as in the case of so-called local improvements, such as sidewalks, curbs, and gutters, it has been held that
the government may depart from general tax equality principles
and levy a special tax, or special assessment, on the property receiving special benefits. The power to levy special assessments is
limited to cases in which there is an actual benefit conferred upon
183 See, e.g., LYON, GoVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN TIE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN

AREA 9 (1957). The number of local governments in the Chicago metropolitan area
is 960.
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the property assessed. The Court has held that, absent such benefit,
18 4
the assessment constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause.
What can be accomplished by varying the charges made by a
general-function district can also be done by the creation of special
improvement, special service, or special tax districts, with or without separate corporate existence. Where such districts are financed
by service charges, problems of equality usually do not arise, since
the charge will vary with the actual use made of the service. Where
a special improvement district is financed by taxation of real property ad valorem, determination of the costs allocated to a given
piece of property will depend upon whether, in fixing the district
boundaries, it is included or excluded. The drawing of the geographical boundary in such cases is the method employed in levying the tax. In Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist.,8 5 the Supreme Court held that property of the salt company located upon
an island in the center of a swampy area could not be included in
a drainage district. The Court found that the island property already had more drainage than it could use and suffered from rapid
run-off of water. Since there could be no benefit to the property,
it could not be included. The Court cited the cases dealing with
special assessments as controlling, demonstrating again that the fixing of geographical boundaries is simply method and cannot have
the effect of relieving government of the constitutional limitations
on its power.
Where general tax funds are used to provide services, the Equal
Protection Clause has been held to require that differences in their
level be rationally justified. The influence of geography in the context of equality is a complex one. Physical facilities must be located
somewhere, and cannot be built and replaced all at the same time.
Thus children whose parents' property is assessed at the same figure
and taxed at the same rate may walk different distances to schools
of varying age and splendor. Where the differences are outside the
constitutionally permitted variations, however, there is every reason
184 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898). The Court has shown some reluctance
to intervene except in plain cases. Cf. French v. Barber Asphalt Co., 181 U.S. 324
(1900).
185 239 U.S. 478 (1916); see also Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239
U.S. 254 (1915).
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to suppose that the Court would intervene, regardless of whether
the discrimination is effected by a geographical device or by some
other. In Brow v. Board of Education,186 the Court held that
simple systematic separation of the races in the public school system is a denial of equal protection of the laws. It is obvious that
a taxing unit charged with the administration of schools is not free
to employ the gerrymander to accomplish the separation forbidden
by the Court. It follows that a state cannot carve itself into noncontiguous school districts that follow no lines save those of ethnology and be protected against judicial intervention. To date no case
involving an allegation of gerrymandering of service districts along
racial lines has reached the Supreme Court. The matter has been
considered at the district court level. In Charlottesville, Virginia,
the school board was ordered to submit a plan for desegregation of
the city schools and warned bluntly by the district judge that the
problem could not be avoided by ingenious carving of districts.
In New Rochelle, New York, the district court has acted to prevent the continued operation of a neighborhood school system that,
it was alleged, was originally designed to accomplish a racially
187
separate school.
The principles applicable to the employment of the geographical
device for effecting discrimination among classes of citizens in the
character or level of services provided are somewhat different in
cases in which the units are separate taxing districts. Here the separation is generally designed to enable localities to provide from
their own pockets services that the general treasury will not support. When the citizen complains that the schools are better in one
community than they are in another, the answer can be straightforward and simple. It is within the power of either to raise the
tax rate and improve the schools. It has long been recognized that
differences based upon local choice are not inequalities that run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, of similar provisions in the
188 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

187 Taylor v. Board of Education 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). Gomillion
vJ. Lightfoot was cited twice, first as enjoining caution on the court in applying
cases out of context and again in connection with the principle that gerrymandered
districts do not meet the requirements of the Brom case. Judge Kaufman noted
that the fact that "a few" Negroes were left within the city limits in Qomillign did
n9 spve the redistrictin-.
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state constitutions, or of state constitutional requirements of tax
equality. If the state should carve itself into school districts according to ethnology, however, there is no reason to believe that such
a system would escape judicial condemnation merely by virtue of
the fact that each would pay for its own. The objection that the
tax burden is unequally distributed would be unavailing, but the
forbidden racial separation would be as plain as if the classification
were free from circumlocution.
Undoubtedly the problems that face the Court in the enforcement of its decision in the Brown case loom large behind the Gomillion decision. Though schools and other services are frequently
operated by special function units, they need not be. If the states
were free to gerrymander the boundaries of cities, counties, and
towns, without regard to contiguity or compactness, and were also
free from judicial scrutiny, the Brown decision could be made
utterly meaningless. White Tuskeegee and black Macon could be
made to mean white school and black school, white golf course and
black golf course, white swimming pool and black swimming pool,
white park and black park. Given the decision in Brown, the Court
had to preserve its power to inquire into geographical boundaries
or it would have lost the battle for elimination of segregated living,
and in this connection a distinction could not be drawn between
special-function and general-function districts.
While it was necessary to make the point that the Court is free
to scrutinize the fixing of municipal boundaries, the facts of the
Gomillion case do not present an ideal case for intervention. Tuskeegee was not made a white city, but a city in which, presumably,
every fourth person was a Negro. Were the schools in the city to
be operated on a non-segregated basis, the number of Negro children
attending a nonsegregated school would exceed the number presently attending such schools in the entire State of Alabama and
perhaps approximate the number in the Deep South. No apartheid
was involved here-only the preservation of local white political
control in an area surrounded by a large Negro population. It could
be said that the maintenance of white political control in the City
of Tuskeegee would postpone the day of desegregation of municipal services, because the ballot is one method of attack upon such
discrimination. One the other hand, the Supreme Court's disposition
of the Brown case gave specific recognition to the need for some
gradualism in the accomplishment of the objective of the decision.
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It is undoubtedly true that desegregation of services is much more
difficult of accomplishment in a unit in which Negroes greatly outnumber whites, because in such areas the consequences of desegregation include much greater practical difficulties in the administration of services.
II. A DRAGON iN THE THIcKET
Gomillion v. Lightfoot serves notice on the South that the
power of a state to determine the powers and boundaries of its
internal political subdivisions is not absolute and cannot be used to
defy or ignore the positive requirements of the Constitution of the
United States. To those who have read the Constitution this should
come as no surprise. It flows directly from the language of the
Supremacy Clause. Nor is it inconsistent with previous decisions.
Rattling Calhoun's bones may stir Southern blood; it has never
frightened the Court. Thickets entail thorns, and the Court has not
been disposed to undertake a general pruning. When there are
dragons to slay and distressed maidens to save, however, the Court
will rise to the occasion.
The key to the riddle of Gomillion lies in balancing the hazards
of a sortie into the thicket against the identity and need for protection of the maiden. There are hints in the decision that the latter
was given controlling weight. The Court characterized the facts as
an unequivocal denial of the right to vote. They need not be so
characterized. The petitioners were qualified electors, highly organized, well directed, and tending toward obtaining local political
control. At the state level, however, they were in a minority. The
situation was one in which a minority political group threatens the
control of the statewide majority in an area in which they can
expect to muster a local majority. As majorities will do, the whites
acted to rearrange the boundaries to preserve their control. This
was to be done in two ways. On the representational level, the
county was to be split up and appended to neighboring counties.
On the local government level the problem was complicated by
the fact that the whites lived in the core of the city and the Negroes
on the periphery. Had the Tuskeegee living pattern been that of
most urban communities, the assurance of continued white control
could have been effected by annexation of the suburbs. Because
that was impossible here, they resorted to shrinking the corporate
limits to a unit in which the statewide majority group could also
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muster a local majority. In short, the objective of the gerrymander
was to permit an enclave of the statewide majority to live in a
political unit in which they would also represent a local majorityperhaps not so evil a motive after all. Though the Court had never
before considered a detachment case in which it was the detached
who complained, it is difficult to distinguish detachment from other
manipulations to make the most of a majority. The Court's seizure
of the loss-of-vote rationale, and the care with which it placed the
result on the Fifteenth Amendment, suggest that its purpose was
not to slay the gerrymander dragon, nor to excise the thorns that
are a normal concomitant of life in the political thicket, but simply
to throw its protective shield around the particularly innocent and
helpless maiden.
As this is being written, the use made of the Gomillion case as a
precedent has been limited to racial discrimination cases, though
not to cases involving the right to vote. It was cited by the federal
district court in New York as supporting the proposition that
school districts may not legally be gerrymandered to effect a racially separate school. s8 It was argued as supporting an investigation into the motives of a condemnation proceeding where it was
alleged that the true purpose was to prevent the construction of
interracial housing.8 9 It was relied upon in a case abolishing a
school board 90 and in another case that substituted the attorney
general of the state for the school board counsel.' 9' It was pleaded
as invalidating a statute permitting the governor to make interim
appointments of school board members, but this contention was
rejected. 192 It is quite possible, however, that in the 1961 Term,
when Baker v. Carr and Scholle v. Secretary of State9 3 force a reexamination of the Court's refusal to undertake the general job of
pruning, the Justices will remember the thorns they encountered
in the thicket of the Tuskeegee dragon hunt.
188 Ibid.

189 Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corporation, 20 ll.2d 132
(1961). The Illinois court distinguished Cdomillion as a case in which the Court
found an "inescapable illegal purpose from the Act itself." No such purpose, of
course, is apparent in the condemnation of property for a park.
190 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E. D. La. 1960).
19' Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 190 F. Supp. 861 (E. D. La. 1960).
192

Singelmann v. Davis, 240 L4. 929 (1960).

193 See text supra, at notes 152-53,
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